I . I ntroduction
Extrinsic monetary rewards or sanctions are frequently used to promote cooperation in social dilemmas. Typical results suggest monetary sanctions effectively promote cooperation, with peer-to-peer sanctioning especially useful in mitigating free-riding behavior (Fehr and Gächter, 2000) .
At the same time, sanctioning mechanisms can adversely impact economic efficiency and lead to spirals of revenge (Sefton et al., 2007 , Denant-Boemont et al. 2007 1 . While monetary reward can help to avoid such concerns, it is typically found to be less effective than sanctions at promoting cooperation (Andreoni etal. 2003 , Sefton et al. 2007 , Stoop et al. 2011 ; likewise, it is often found no more efficient than environments lacking sanctions (Jan et al. 2011 ).
Yet another downside of monetary rewards and sanctions is that both may have a substantially detrimental impact on pro-social decisions when employed in competitive environments (Andreoni 1995; Fuster and Meier 2010) .
In light of this, recently attention has turned to non-monetary incentives. Studies include Masclet et al. (2002) , which reports that while nonmonetary sanctions have a positive initial impact on cooperation, the positive impact cannot be sustained (see also Noussair and Tucker, 2005) . Also, Dugar (2007) shows that social approval is most effective when combined with the opportunity to express social disapproval 2 . Aside from our own work in this area 3 , however, we are unaware of any investigation into the impact of 1 Other related papers reporting detrimental impacts of sanction include but are not limited to: Gneezy and Rustichini 2000 , Fehr and Rochenbach 2003 , Noussair et al 2007 , Deber et al. 2008 , Houser et al. 2008 , Li et al. 2009 Rewards are found to be effective in infinitely repeated interactions (Rand et al. 2009 , Al--Ubaydli et al. 2010 . Also note that the Baseline treatment we report below is modeled after 3 Pan and Houser (2011) reports three of the four treatments reported in this paper (the new in our data to theories in evolutionary psychology, with an emphasis on gender effects. The present paper pursues a very different approach, analyzing and interpreting aggregate data patterns through the lens of economic theory. Loosely speaking, the first paper is interested competition on cooperation in environments with non-monetary rewards (and in particular, social approval). Holländer (1990) provided an early and influential model of voluntary contributions under peer-to-peer approval 4 . He showed that as long as social approval is sufficiently valued by participants, equilibria with positive contributions can exist. On the other hand, if approval is not sufficiently valued, then model implies that zero cooperation is the unique Nash equilibrium. Consequently, for the purpose of institution design, it is crucial to know which environmental features might encourage people to assign high value to social approval. We focus on the possibility that this might occur in environments that include competition for social approval.
Sosocial approval might increase as a result of competition (see, e.g., Ariely et al. 2009 , Bénabou and Tirole 2003 , Harbaugh 1998 , Glazer and Konrad 1996 .
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Drawing on signaling motives, providing empirical evidence that helps to clarify when and how competition can be used to promote the value of social approval, and thereby encourage pro-social behavior.
in identifying specifically who did and did not respond to specific treatment contexts and then developing an explanation for why; the present paper attempts to explain aggregate behavior using economic theory that might generalize across contexts in a way that informs the design of institutions to promote pro--sociality.
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This indirect monitoring mechanism is also proposed by Arnott and Stiglitz (1991) where they argued for its advantages over alternative systems in mitigating moral hazard. These other systems include direct monitoring (the principal monitoring the agents himself), or supervision (the principal hires a supervisor to monitor the agents). Moreover, they argued for the importance of utility interdependence among economic agents to incentivize such peer monitoring, which is presented here as a public goods game.
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image motives, e idea is that an directed by a desire to create a good impression in the eyes of others. Signaling motives have been invoked to explain a number of pro--social behaviors, including why charities advertise arbaugh 1998), why football teams place highly visible emblems on the helmets of high performers (Wired 2011), and why top employees are rewarded with prizes, e.g., gold cups for employees of the month.
We analyze two-stage public goods games with various non-monetary prizes as rewards. Public goods games have been widely used to investigate behavior when self-interest conflicts with social-interest (Fehr and Gächter 2000 , Masclet et al. 2002 , Noussair and Tucker 2007 , Ledyard 1995 . In our games, each player receives an identical monetary endowment. In the first stage, four players simultaneously select a fraction of the endowment to contribute to a group account, while keeping the remainder for themselves. All funds in the group account pay a positive return to each member of the group.
In the second stage, each subject has an opportunity, after observing his/her -monetary approval points to each of his/her fellow group members. The approval points range from zero to ten and come at no cost to the subject.
Our experiment includes four treatments. Baseline includes neither competition nor rewards. Subjects learn only the total approval they received from other group members in each round. The other three treatments include rewards and competition, and are named after the available reward. The Star treatment includes competition for electronic gold stars in each period. As in Baseline, subjects learn the total approval they received; however, they also learn whether they earned the most approval. The subject who earns the most approval receives an electronic gold star. The Ice-cream and Mug treatments are identical to Star except that each gold star increases the probability of receiving a final reward by ten percentage points. The rewards in these two treatments are a Häggen-Dazs ice-cream bar or mugs emblazoned with our , respectively. Note that the mug, which can later be shown to others, has a signaling value that electronic stars and ice-cream bars lack.
Our key finding is that competition for social approval promotes cooperation only when winners receive non-cash rewards with signaling value (the Mug). Moreover, our data reveal that approval is dispensed differently under different final rewards, and in a way that is consistent with Holländer (1990) . In particular, we show that Hollä with signaling value can lead to approval being assigned based more on relative rather than absolute contributions, and further predicts increased contribution in equilibrium as a result of enhanced utility derived from approval received. Our data is consistent with both of these predictions.
Further, we find that a non-cash reward with the same monetary value but no signaling value is unable to instantiate a competition. Therefore, both approval assignment and contributions present a similar pattern in relation to the Baseline treatment without competition or rewards. Hollä predicts that this should be the case. The reason is that in this environment, approval should have little or no social value, and is thus unable to initiate an increase in contribution.
This paper takes a step toward a better understanding of alternatives to monetary incentives for promoting cooperation by examining how competition for non-monetary social approval impacts pro-social behaviors in a social dilemma experiment. Additionally, our investigation informs how different rewards out of competition impact peer decisions on how to award approval.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 introduces our extension of Hollä odel, which concludes that status orientation and the weight given to approval utility are two key factors influencing that rate of social approval and the level of cooperation in equilibrium. Section 3 describes our experiment design, which varies the incentives that influence these two major factors. Section 4 describes our hypotheses, namely how the incentives we introduce may impact equilibrium. Section 5 reports our results. Finally, Section 6 concludes and discusses further possible research.
The Model
This paper investigates how social approval impacts behavior in various competitive environments. Our comparison between treatments focuses on: (i) how people respond to contributions with approval; and (ii)
how people respond to approval with contributions.
Our investigation is guided by Holländer (1990) 
Total utility is assumed to depend not only on approval, but also on additively separable components. This is due to consumption of private and public goods. Departing sli these components according to nonch sum to one (without loss of generality). While these weights are not explicitly specified in Holländer (1990) , it is convenient for the purpose of our analysis to do so.
Thus, the utility function for person i is as follows:
Note that in our proofs below, as in Holländer (1990) , we assume monotonicity and concavity of the utility function. We further assume that the absolute elasticity of is smaller than one.
Having specified preferences, we turn now to the process by which approval is received. We first define the subjective value of a unit contribution, w, as Then, we assume total approval is determined by a weighted average of absolute and comparative components, with corresponding weights and It follows that the amount of approval received is determined by: ) where .
Then, by substituting (3) into (1), we can express utility for approval as a function of the approval rate, person i n, and the average contribution, as follows:
The coefficient is important for our purposes below, and indicates the strength of the externality stemming from the average contribution. One can think of : when others contribute more, utility is reduced due to the fact that With this notation, utility can be expressed as:
We turn now to the way people choose to send approval. Holländer (1990) hypothesizes that the individual approval rate is equal to the marginal rate of substitution between endowment and average contribution with respect to the utility function (2).
( 5) his subjective value of ontribution.
In , agents are rational actors. In particular, for given , an agent is assumed to choose in order to maximize utility. The inequality below characterizes optimal decisions, and holds with equality if >0.
We are now in a position to state and prove the following propositions.
Proposition 1: Optimization defines an individual contribution function with (i) if and only if and (ii) .
The first condition derives from the concavity assumption of the utility function. Ceteris paribus, a stronger status orientation (a bigger ) will lead to higher individual contributions. Increased average contributions by others also increases contributions, in an effort to induce efforts to regain the status lost.
Define a equilibrium to occur when each individual contribution is equal to the average contribution, in the sense that .
Substituting this constraint into (6), one obtains the curve:
Exploiting the properties of the utility function, one then obtains:
Proposition 2: In a equilibrium, individual contributions and the supply of the collective good are a function with i) if and only if and ii) .
Next, define an approval (VW) equilibrium as occurring when aggregate approval rates equal individual behavior, so that . Substituting this condition into (6) into (5) and observing , one obtains the following:
When both VW and gG equilibria exist simultaneously, we (like Holländer) say there is a The figure depicts how an increase in , status orientation, and an increase in , the weight of utility derived from received approval, affects equilibrium.
In general, an increase in leads to a decrease in the approval rate w, and has an ambiguous affect on equilibrium contributions. This is represented in Figure 1 by a change from e1* to the new equilibrium e2*. An increase in alone necessarily results in higher equilibrium contributions, causing to shift right to , resulting in lower approval rate at e3*. While the effect of an increased has either positive or negative effect on contributions in equilibrium, an increase in has an unambiguously positive impact on equilibrium contributions.
Proposition 3: The effect of increased on equilibrium is to decrease the approval rate in equilibrium while having an ambiguous impact on contribution.
Suppose there is an increase in . The VW curve will shift downward by to VW1, and will pivot clockwise at , to This will lead to a smaller w* (approval rate) in equilibrium. Depending on the movement of , the level of new contribution in equilibrium remains unclear. If it pivots clockwise, then the new equilibrium e2* has the same contribution level as the old equilibrium e1*. Yet, if curve pivots less or further clockwise, then the new contribution in equilibrium will be either smaller or bigger than the previous contribution in equilibrium.
Proposition 4: The effect on equilibrium of an increase in is to increase the level of contributions and to decrease the approval rate.
Increasing the weight of approval on overall utility results in the slope of the curve becoming flatter at any given . This leads to a clockwise pivot of the curve. Also, a reduced ratio generates a downward shift of the curve. It is clear that both of these effects lead to an increase in equilibrium contributions and to a decrease in the equilibrium approval rate w*.
Proposition 5: For given and , there exists a unique social equilibrium (w* , g* ) with w* >0 and g* >0 if and only if This is the condition which allows the VW and curve to intersect. If: (i) the marginal utility from private good at endowment is still too big; (ii) the marginal utility from approval at initial zero is too small; or (iii) the marginal utility from public goods at initial zero is still small, then we would not expect to observe the social equilibrium exchange between contribution and approval.
It is worthwhile to further discuss the impact of status orientation ) on contributions and approval rate in equilibrium. Suppose there is an increase in both and ; if an increase of has positive impact on contribution in equilibrium, then we would expect the effect of and influence the equilibrium in the same direction, leading to a lower approval rate and an increased contribution. On the other hand, if an increase of has negative impact on contributions in equilibrium, then the overall equilibrium change in contributions depends on which effect is greater.
In either case, the approval rate is predicted to be lower in equilibrium.
Our experiment design informs the theoretical results described by the propositions. In particular, as detailed in the next section, one of our treatments influences (Star), while others impact both (Mug and Ice-cream) . In addition, we also consider a (Baseline).
Experiment Design
Motivated by Holländer (1990) , the goal of our design is to exogenously vary competition and signaling incentives (see, e.g., Ariely et al. 2009 ) to discover whether they influence the utility value of social approval.
Our mechanism for doing this involves the use of non-cash rewards with small monetary value. This is a widely-adopted approach that has been found effective in the cooperation literature (Lacetera and Macis 2010 We conducted a willingness--to--pay elicitation to the two rewards. As described below, we found the values to be statistically (and nearly pointwise) identical.
The Baseline Treatment:
In the Baseline treatment, participants play ten periods of a public good game in fixed groups of four. In each period, each group member receives an endowment of 20 Experimental Dollars (E$) and can contribute any integer amount between 0 and 20 to a public ). All group members decide simultaneously on their each period. The monetary payoff of each individual from the group project each period is given by (1) where is the marginal per capita return from each 1E$ contribution to the public good. Following the previous literature Gächter 1999, Maslet et al. 2002) , is set to equal to 0.4. For each participant, the cost of contributing 1E$ to the public good is 0.6 E$, while the total benefit to his/her fellow group members is 1.2 E$. Therefore, it is always in material self-interest to invest 0 E$, regardless of the contributions of the group members. At the same time, the group payoff is maximized if all group members contribute their full endowment.
After group members have privately made their own contribution decisions, they are then shown the contribution decisions of each of their group members. Next, subjects are able to assign approval ratings to each of their group members. The ratings can be any integer value from 0 to 10, with 0 indicating the least approval and 10 indicating the greatest. All approval decisions are made simultaneously and subjects are unable to assign approval to themselves. Sending approval is not costly and, in this treatment, has no impact on the final earnings of the receiver.
Reward Treatments
The Star treatment differs from the Baseline in that after the approval assignment, an electronic gold star is given to the participant with the highest approval ratings from his/her group members. In case of a tie, all of the most highly-approved subjects earn a gold star. Thus, each subject can receive up to ten stars over ten periods. At the end of each period, subjects are informed of In Mug and Ice-cream, participants have an added incentive to contribute, but our willingness-to-pay elicitation suggests these incentives are small and identical between reward treatments (see details in Section 2.4).
Thus, the Nash equilibrium strategy would still be to contribute nothing to the public good. Nevertheless, if subjects place sufficient pecuniary value on the rewards, it becomes evident that positive contributions could be consistent with the Nash equilibrium in reward treatments. Any such pecuniary effects would be identical between reward treatments and therefore could not explain between-treatment differences.
Comparing the Star and Baseline treatments measures the effects of competition per se (pure symbolic rewards) on overall cooperation. In particular, it measures how the presence of competition alone affects social approval, and how people respond to such shift. Comparing the approval assignment and the corresponding contributions between the Star and Icecream or Mug treatments helps us understand whether providing additional rewards with low monetary value and/or signaling value influences the assignment of social approval. In particular, we are able to discover whether the signaling incentive enhances the value of received approval, thereby promoting cooperation.
Procedures
A total of 200 students from George Mason University participated in our public goods experiment at the Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science. The experiment used the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) .
Upon entering the laboratory, each subject was seated in a carrel separated from other subjects in a way that ensured anonymity. All interactions in the experiment took place anonymously. Participants then received written instructions. After the experimenter read the instructions aloud, participants were quizzed to ensure they understood the procedures and the payoff structure. The experiment did not proceed until each subject had completed the quiz successfully.
Participants who earned stars in the Mug or Ice-cream treatments had the opportunity to draw once from a deck of ten cards, numbered 1 through 10.
Subjects would receive the reward if the number they drew was equal to or smaller than the number of stars they earned during the experiment. The experimenter distributed the reward, along with the cash payment, to each subject privately. The experiments lasted 45-50 minutes, and on average subjects earned $16.00 per session.
Willingness-to-pay (WTP) Elicitation
We recruited 30 students who had not participated in the goods experiment to take part in the WTP elicitation. This experiment adopted the Becker-DeGroot- 
Hypotheses
Hypothesis 1: Approval rate will be lowest in the Mug treatment, followed by the I ce-cream and Star treatments, and highest in the Baseline
treatment.
The above arguments demonstrate that if we assume the competitiveness of the environment is positively related to the monetary value of the reward, then rewards with higher monetary value should result in an increase in both , leading to a reduction in equilibrium approval rate. Star induces a stronger positive influence from a change in than does the negative influence from a change in . occurs when competition alone (Star) induces a stronger negative effect from increase in than the positive effect from an increase in ; Similarly, occurs when not only the competition fails, but also the monetary value fails to generate enough approval weight on . Or, as in , none of these effects is sufficient to induce enough weight on approval utility. This means the positive impact from fails to elicit further contributions due to the negative effect of It follows that, in this scenario, contribution in Baseline exceed all other treatments.
Results
Result 1a. Approval assignment depends on relative contribution differences in treatments with competition.
We find that across treatments, the level of approval assigned by one individual to another is: (i) decreasing in the difference between the contributions of the approval sender and approval receiver; and (ii) decreasing in the difference between the contribution of the approval receiver and the average contribution of the other group members. This is shown in Figure 2 below, which demonstrates that for all treatments, as the difference ( ) Approval assigned from i to k
Contribution differences between i and k (gi--gk)
A regression of the approval person i assigned to k in period t on contribution differences between person i and k in the same period confirms the findings represented in Figure 2 after controlling the differences between person k and the average contribution of the other group members. Table 2 describes the results of this regression. The main finding is that approval assigned is lower in reward treatments than in Baseline. Star has the smallest estimated coefficient (-1.68 and significant), while Mug has the least negative (-0.56, and statistically insignificant). This indicates that given the same contribution differences, participants withhold the most approval points in Star. This is consistent with Figure 2 where we see the line for Star lower than its counterparts.Likewise, the asymmetric pattern revealed in Figure 2 is also confirmed in the regression results. Table 2 clearly shows that while person i sends significantly less approval to those who contributed less than him/her, he/she does not send significantly more to those who contributed more than him. Finally, from Table 2 one immediately sees that approval assignment increases (decreases) in the positive (negative) difference between the receiver and the average contribution of her other group members. In the theoretical model, the is assumed to be the group average for simplicity and ease of members. Overall contributions are significantly higher in Mug than any other treatment ( Figure 3a) . We further find that the Star treatment has the lowest level of contributions (falling even below Baseline). Moreover, the frequency of full contributions is highest in Mug. For example, from period 6 to 10, 48.2%
of subjects in Mug contributed their entire endowment, while only 29.2% did so in Baseline and 18.8% in Ice-cream (Fig. 3b) .
A parametric analysis confirms these results. After controlling for group contributions and peirod effects, we find an unconditionally higher contribution in Mug using a random effect GLS regression (the dummy for the Mug treatment is significant at 4.18, but insignificant for the other treatments). Being a star-winner in period t-1 also has a positive effect on period t contributions in all rewards treatments (significant at 1.4 in Mug and at 2.4 in Ice-cream).
Overall then, we find support for hypothesis : the positive effect of increasing approval utility driven by monetary value does not overwhelm the negative impact of increased status orientation due to increased competition, thus we observe a lower contribution in Ice-cream than Baseline .
Yet, such negative impact is evidently more than offset by increases in signaling value.
a. groups, z=-1.987, P=0.047) and Ice-cream (23%, z=2.734, P=0.006).
Concluding Discussion
We studied the impact of peer-to-peer competition for social approval on cooperation in a social dilemma environment. We obtained data suggesting that competition for a final reward with signalling value promotes pro-social behaviour. In contrast, when the reward has no signalling value, the same competition mechanism reduces cooperation in relation to an environment that includes only social motives for contributions. Our analysis was guided by a model proposed by Holländer (1990) , who developed equilibria in which positive contributions exchange for social approval. The model suggests two key determinants of equilibrium: the relative importance of approval utility in overall utility (denoted above by ), and status orientation (denoted above by ). Our design varied features of the environment that we expected to influence the value of those parameters. In particular, treatments varied in terms of: (i) the competitive environment; (ii) the presence of non-monetary social approval; and (iii) the nature of a non-cash reward out of competition. We found that people assigned approval and responded to approval differently under different treatments, and in a way that is consistent with Holländer (1990) .
Note that other models, such as Kandel and Lazear (1992) 9 , share the feature that individuals make strategic decisions regarding how much to approve (or disapprove, as in Kandel and Lazear) and how much to contribute.
While both assume that approval (or disapproval) influences contributions,
Hollander goes further to assume a specific relationship between the way approval is assigned and contribution decisions. This allows one to connect approval rates to contributions in equilibrium. Moreover, it is worth noting that displaying disapproval implies a utility cost model. Consequently, increased cooperation arising from expressions of disapproval may not enhance social welfare.
We found approval assignment to vary with the nature of the reward out of competition. Under competition, approval assignment is based more on relative than absolute contributions. Given the same contribution differences, absolute approval is withheld the most in Star and least in Mug. This may partially explain a lower contribution in all competition treatments except Other theoretical models (see, e.g., Akerlof (1980 ), Lindbeck et al (1999 ) also develop models that can incorporate the influence of peers through, for example, social norms. However, economic agents in these models are unable to use either approval (as in Hollander) or disapproval (as in Kandel and Lazear) to influence social norms. Rather, norms in their models emerge through herding, reciprocity or types of social--learning.
Mug, where competition may drive attention towards a spiteful withholding of approval rather than creating a healthy competition for higher contributions.
This higher cooperation level in Mug is consistent with higher utility associated with each unit of approval. The result is ing up with the
Mug. On the other hand, cooperation in
Star is lower than in Baseline, which appears to indicate that competition absent rewards with signaling value is detrimental to cooperation.
It is worthwhile to note that positive contributions in games with valuable final rewards are not necessarily inconsistent with a subgame-perfect equilibrium in which agents maximize their monetary payoff, so long as agents place sufficient value on ice-cream or a mug. We found, however, that WTP is identical between these rewards. This means that while value to any particular subject could potentially rationalize contributions, it cannot explain the substantial differences we observe between the Mug and Ice-cream treatments.
As Holländer (1990) argued, approval contributions is consistent with the positive emotional impact of approbation (see also Gätcher 2000, Fehr and Fischbacher 2003) . In a standard public goods game, the negative emotion from cooperators may help to generate a collapse of cooperation over time. Indeed, it is perhaps surprising that the contribution momentum in Mug was sustained to the ninth round. This is particularly true in light of the presence of systematic low-contributors, as well as substantial theoretical and empirical evidence that free-riding is contagious (Fehr and Fischbacher 2003; Fischbacher et al., 2001 ). The proximate mechanism behind sustained contributions may also work through an emotion mechanism. While cooperators express frustration with free-riders in a standard public goods game by reducing their contributions, approval from free-riders may help to appease cooperators. In particular, free-riders can reciprocate by assigning approval to cooperators, thereby increasing the chance that a cooperator receives a mug reward .
Our paper is limited in that it investigates only non-cash rewards with small monetary value. Previous scholars have suggested that cash rewards have non-monotonic effects on pro-social behaviors (Gneezy and Rustichini 2000) . Therefore, it might be interesting for further studies to measure the efficacy of non-cash rewards with alternative monetary values.
Additionally, while rewards were distributed privately in our environment 10 , a public reward, particularly one with signaling value, may serve to further promote cooperation (Andreoni and Petrie 2004, Rege and Telle 2004) .
Our research demonstrates that the value of social approval is high in environments with competition for displayable rewards. This promotes cooperation due to a direct effect on preferences as well as an indirect effect arising from a change in the process by which people assign and value approval. In particular, it appears that a competitive environment shifts the approval assignment so that it is based more on relative than absolute contributions. At the same time, it increases the value an individual places on the approval they receive. To avoid experimenter demand effect (our willingness--to--pay elicitation already controlled for alternative explanations for contribution differences between Ice--cream and Mug treatments).
